Reorganization of Railroads under the Bankruptcy Act by Garrison, Lloyd K.
LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATION
a complete set of Rules-so designated-may prompt the court to act in the
future. If the court does act, a more flexible procedure should result.
CONCLUSIONS
Despite the efforts of the draftsmen to construct a bill that will state the law
precisely and simply, yet, if the bill be enacted, a period of substantial confusion
of the law will follow. Since most of the sections are adaptations of existing law
in this or other states, and since those provisions have already been construed
by the courts, the period of confusion will, perhaps, not be as protracted nor
as intense as might be expected.
It is reasonable to suppose that following the period of construction there
will be a simplification of many of the problems now encountered in our pro-
cedure in civil cases. The proposed act is wholesome and far-reaching, and in-
dicates a thorough consideration of the problems of practice from a practical as
well as a theoretical standpoint.
It is also quite likely that the proposed act will produce an improvement in
judicial administration, particularly in the field of trial practice. Undoubtedly,
pleading problems will be greatly simplified. The enactment of the proposed
bill will produce, in form at least, an extension, to the common law field, of sim-
plified forms of equity pleading now generally employed in Illinois.
REORGANIZATION OF RAILROADS UNDER THE
BANKRUPTCY ACT
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B Y THE Act of March 3, 1933' three new forms of procedure for the relief
of debtors were added to the Bankruptcy Act.2 The most important of
these (Section 77) relates to the reorganization of railroads engaged in inter-
state commerce.3 In every respect this section is unique in the history of our
legislation.
It brings railroads, for the first time, within the scope of the Bankruptcy Act.
It represents the first attempt in this country4 to provide a statutory method for
* Dean, the University of Wisconsin Law School.
'Public-no. 420-72d Congress [H.R. 143591.
2The Act of July i, z898, as amended [ir U.S.C.].
3 The statute excludes (§ 77r) any "street, suburban, or interurban electric railway
which is not operated as a part of a general railroad system of transportation or which does not
derive more than so per centum of its operating revenues from the transportation of freight in
standard steam railroad freight equipment."
4 Since 187o England has had a reorganization statute. In its original form it provided
that a plan affecting a given class of creditors could be made binding upon the consent of a
majority in number representing three-fourths in value of the creditors of such class. In igoo
the statute was enlarged by the adoption of a similar provision relating to stockholders. For
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reorganization embracing both creditors and stockholders. It probably goes
further than any other statute in the extent to which, in a proceeding com-
menced and terminated in court, responsibilities and power are given to a com-
mission (the Interstate Commerce Commission). It is also unlike any other
statute in the extent to which the functions of court and commission are made
interacting and interdependent. In enabling two-thirds of the holders of mort-
gage bonds to compel the minority to take unsecured obligations or even stock
in place of their bonds, it affects securities in a way never before attempted in
this country. And in further providing that the debtor's property shall not be
liquidated, that the debtor shall not be adjudged or even called a "bankrupt,"
and that the interests of stockholders as well as the claims of creditors may be
dealt with, it represents the furthest limit of power which Congress has ever
presumed to exercise under the "bankruptcy clause" of the Constitution.5
The legislation is as important economically as it is novel in form. Some fifty
or more railroads are now in receivership, awaiting reorganization. 6 According
to authoritative statements in Congress, loans totalling about $3oo,000,000
have already been made to railroads by the Reconstruction Finance Corpora-
tion and have not been repaid; 7 applications for loans totalling more than $ioo,-
ooo,ooo are pending and probably will not be granted;8 and, in the face of dwin-
dling revenues and mounting deficits, some $3oo,ooo,ooo of railroad obligations
will shortly be maturing.9 Under these circumstances wholesale reorganization
of capital structures would seem to be inevitable. Hitherto the only process for
effecting such reorganization has been the equity receivership,--generally, and
in the case of interstate railroads universally, brought about in the Federal
the latest form of the statute see the Companies Act, 1929, 19-2o Geo. 5, C. 23, §§ 153 to 155;
and Sophian, The Companies Act, 1929. The Canadian Bankruptcy Act contains a reorganiza-
tion section modelled on the English Companies Act (Act of July 7, i919, 9- i o Geo. 5, c. 36,
§ 13 as amended by Act of June 28, 1922, 12-13 Geo. 5).
5 Section 8, Article I ("Congress shall have power .... to establish .... uniform laws on
the subject of bankruptcies"). The new legislation seems unquestionably to fall within this
grant of power. See the "Memorandum by the Solicitor General relative to S. 3866 and H.R.
9968, to amend the Bankruptcy Act" (Senate Committee Print, 72d Cong. 2d Sess. Also
printed in 76 Cong. Rec., 72d Cong., 2d Sess., 2912). See also Rosenberg, A New Scheme of
Reorganization, 17 Col. L. Rev. 523 (917); Garrison, The Power of Congress over Corporate
Reorganizations, ig Va. L. Rev. 343 (1933).
6 See Moody, Steam Railroads (1932), A i8; Moody, Manual for Steam Railroads (1932),
866; and the Annual Report of the Interstate Commerce Commission for 1932, pp. i5, i6,
-quoted by Swaine, Corporate Reorganization under the Federal Bankruptcy Power, 19 Va.
L. Rev. 317, 318 (i933).
76 Cong. Rec., 72d Cong., 2d Sess. 5251 (by Sen. Hastings, Feb. 27, 1933), and 5270 (by
Sen. Couzens, Feb. 27, 1933).
8 1bid., 5269 (by Sen. Couzens, Feb. 27, 1933); and 2898 (from the House Judiciary Com-
mittee report on the bill, Jan. 28, 1933, stating that the railroads generally "have reached the
limit of their ability to borrow from the R.F.C.").
9 By Sen. Hastings, 76 Cong. Rec., 72d Cong., 2d Sess. 5251 (1933).
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courts. The waste, delay and inefficiency of this process, and the opportunities
for exploitation which it sometimes affords have long been notorious; and such
success as it has achieved has been increasingly threatened by proposed legis'a-
tionlo that would limit or abolish diversity of citizenship as a ground for Federal
jurisdiction. Hence the importance of the new procedure, which, it is hoped,
will provide an economical, expeditious and effective method of reorganization
adequately protected against abuse, and based upon a sure jurisdictional foun-
dation.
The procedure under Section 77, and the respects in which it remedies exist-
ing defects may be outlined as follows:
A railroad may file a petition stating that it is insolvent or unable to meet its
debts as they mature and that it desires to effect a plan of reorganization." Or,
with the approval of the Interstate Commerce Commission, after a hearing upon
notice to the railroad, creditors with claims aggregating 5% of its indebtedness"2
may file a petition against the railroad alleging that it is unable to meet its debts
and that a reorganization should be effected. The railroad's only defenses to
such a petition are that the creditors' claims are insufficient or that the road is
solvent. Upon approving the petition (whether voluntary or involuntary) the
court may appoint a temporary trustee and, after a hearing upon notice to
creditors and stockholders, a permanent trustee, selected in either case from a
panel of standing trustees to be designated by the commission.3 The trustee
takes title to the assets wherever located, and, "subject to the judge's control
and the jurisdiction of the commission as provided by the Interstate Commerce
Act," may operate the debtor's business13a There are no provisions for a re-
ceiver, and it is not even necessary to appoint a trustee. For the approval of the
petition vests 4 in the court "exclusive jurisdiction of the debtor and its property
wherever located," and the court, by a simple order upon confirmation of the
reorganization, may direct that the property be transferred to a new corpora-
tion or revested in the old, without the interposition of a trustee.'5
By these provisions "friendly" receiverships, with the abuses sometimes at-
tendant upon them,'6 and ancillary receiverships, with their accompanying
waste, delay and inefficiency,7 are completely eliminated. The avoidance of
ancillary receiverships alone would justify the new legislation.
After approving the petition the court "shall determine a reasonable time
10 See, for example, S. 939 (the "Norris bill") and S. 937 (the "Attorney General's bill"),
72d Cong., ist Sess.
" § 77a-
12 As shown "in the latest annual report which it has filed with the commission." § 77a.
13 § 77c. ,33 § 77c. '4 § 77a. 15 § 77J.
16 See Harkin v. Brundage, 276 U.S. 36,48 Sup. Ct. 268, 72 L.Ed. 457 (1928); Michigan v.
Michigan Trust Co., 286 U.S. 334, 52 Sup. Ct. 512, 76 L.Ed. 1136 (1932).
'7 The conditions are "not only destructive of the assets but of respect for the courts as
well." From an address by Solicitor General Thacher, Rep. of Ill. State Bar Ass'n., 339, 343
(1932).
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within which the claims and interests of creditors and stockholders may be filed
or evidenced and after which no such claim or interest may participate in any
plan except on order for cause shown; the manner in which such claims and in-
terests may be fied or evidenced and allowed, and, for the purposes of the plan
and its acceptance, the division of creditors and stockholders into classes ac-
cording to the nature of their respective claims and interests."' 8 This divsion
into classes is a matter of prime importance, for, as will be explained, voting
upon the plan is by classes.
When the court has made this determination and the debtor (or the trustee if
one has been appointed) has filed a complete list of creditors and stockholders,sa
the commission is ready to begin its share of the work. It begins by holding a
public hearing at which plans of reorganization may be presented by the rail-
road, by the trustee if any, and by creditors representing at least io% in amount
of the claims of any class. Following the hearing the commission is required to
"render a report" recommending a plan, which may or may not be different
from any previously proposed. The report will presumably be made public, for
the statute provides that upon petition for good cause shown, and upon further
hearing if necessary, the commission may modify its recommendations. After
the commission has thus finally recommended a plan, the plan is submitted to
the creditors and stockholders, and any rival plans may be similarly submitted.'9
If the plan recommended by the commission is accepted by creditors and
stockholders in the manner presently to be described, it is certified to the court
with the commission's approval and a report of the proceedings.20 If some other
plan, however, is accepted, the commission holds a further hearing, after which
it may approve the plan and certify it to the court or disapprove it."' The com-
mission's veto power is absolute. If a plan is not approved within such reason-
able time as the court may fix, the court may dismiss the proceedings; but the
court has no power to consider a plan not approved by the commission.
These provisions mark a great departure from the ordinary equity receiver-
ship procedure. "Reorganizations," as one expert in the field has said,22 "al-
ways develop into considerable jockeying, often long drawn out, for position
among the several classes of creditors and stockholders; and they frequently
also become an endurance test wherein the class of security-holders that is will-
ing to wait the longest becomes the pivotal class and stands a good chance of
getting the most favorable terms." Under the new legislation, by contrast, the
responsibility for going forward is placed upon the commission, whose only in-
terest will be in formulating as promptly as possible an equitable and feasible
plan; and while committees of security holders will continue to play an impor-
tant part, they will no longer dominate the proceedings, and if they delay too
long in reaching an agreement the proceedings may be dismissed.23
18 § 77c. is. § 77c. 19 The provisions outlined in this paragraph are in § 77d.
-§ 77f. -' § 77f. " Under § 77c.
- Roberts Walker, Reorganization by Decree, 6 Corn. L. Quar. 154 (1921).
n Under § 77c.
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The activities and power of private interests and of those representing them
are further affected by provisions that the fees and expenses of all committees,
attorneys, reorganization managers and other agents and assistants, as well as
the fees and expenses of the trustee, and of any special masters (who may be ap-
pointed by the court only from a standing panel24 designated by the Circuit
Court of Appeals), may be allowed by the court within maximum limits fixed in
each case by the commission.25 And these allowances embrace not only amounts
to be paid out of the property of the debtor corporation but also amounts to be
paid by any transferee corporation after consummation of the plan.26 Thus re-
organization fees and expenses are brought within the effective control of both
the court and the commission-a control which hitherto has been only partial
and has sometimes been circumvented in a manner not free from criticism.27
When a plan has been finally approved and certified to the court as described
above, the court is required to hold a public hearing on notice to creditors and
stockholders at which all objections to the plan will be considered whether or
not they were previously heard by the commission.' 8 In the House bill, the
court's function was limited to a mere consideration of the record made before
the commission. Fortunately this provision was eliminated by the Senate,29 so
that the court may hear de novo both proponents and opponents of the plan.
The court, after this hearing, may reject the plan and, "after considering any
recommendation which has been filed by the commission," dismiss the proceed-
ings; or confirm the plan if satisfied, among other things, that it "is equitable
and does not discriminate unfairly in favor of any class of creditors or stock-
holders," and that certain classes of dissenters, presently to be described, are
adequately protected.30
The ordinary equity reorganization terminates in a sale of the assets, being
based upon a creditor's bill;3' and the only power of the court over the plan of
reorganization is an indirect one derived from its power to prevent a sale for less
24 In the form in which the bill [H.R. 14359] passed the House, it.provided for six special
referees to be appointed for six-year terms by the President with the advice and consent of the
Senate. The substitute provision for special masters, adopted by the Senate and accepted by
the House, was suggested by Solicitor General Thacher. (See his memorandum in 76 Cong.
Rec., 72d Cong., 2d Sess., Appendix P. 2912; and seep. 2894.) Referees in bankruptcy have no
functions under the bill.
25 §§ 77c and 77f. 26 § 77g.
27 See the remarks of Senator Norris, 76 Cong. Rec., 72d Congress, 2d Sess., 5040, with
reference to the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. reorganization.
28 § 77g.
29 It was vigorously criticized in the Solicitor General's memorandum cited in note 24,
supra.
30 § 77g.
3! The nature of the jurisdiction is thoroughly described in Re Metropolitan Ry. Receiver-
ship, 208 U.S. 9o, 9o Sup. Ct. 112, 52 L.Ed. 403 (1go8).
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
than a fair upset price.32 Resourceful and vigorous judges have in this manner
come to exert a considerable pressure in the shaping of a proper plan, and in
rare instances have dominated the decisions of the reorganization committees.33
But their power rests more upon personality and a capacity for negotiation than
upon any legal basis, and in the long run cannot be truly effective in dealing with
the "masterful situation 34 of majorities armed with consents from security
holders who too often are merely "dumb sheep."35
Under the new legislation, by contrast, the purpose and the end of the pro-
ceeding is not a sale of the assets to satisfy claims but the confirmation or dis-
approval of a plan of reorganization. The court is given direct and absolute
power to consider the plan on its merits and to dispose of it accordingly.
If it is true that in equity reorganizations there is no effective control over
"masterful" majorities, it is equally true that there is no effective control over
obstreperous minorities seeking to capitalize their nuisance value. The court's
limited and indirect power to reject an unfair plan does not enable it to compel
unruly dissenters to accept a fair plan. And these dissenters cannot be com-
pelled to take securities in the reorganized corporation but may insist upon pay-
ment in cash of the value of their interest in the debtor's property-cash which
cannot always be raised by the reorganized company.36 So it happens that "re-
sourceful minorities with no substantial equities in their position frequently,
though losing at every stage of the proceeding, succeed in delaying for years"-
if indeed they do not entirely block-"reorganizations having the substantially
unanimous approval of the security holders and ultimately found by the courts
of last resort to be entirely equitable and valid."'37
Under the new legislation all this is changed. The consent of two-thirds in
amount of a given class of creditors or stockholders makes the plan, upon con-
firmation, absolutely binding upon all the creditors or stockholders of that
class;35 and their respective rights and interests may be modified in any way
provided in the plan "either through the issuance of new securities of any char-
acter or otherwise."'39 Complete flexibility is thus provided. Preferred stock or
31 See Merchants' Loan & Trust Co. v. Chi. Rys., 158 Fed. 923 (C.C.A. 7th. 1907);
Guaranty Trust Co. v. Missouri Pacific Ry., 238 Fed. 812, 814 (D.C. Mo. 1916).
33 See Rosenberg, The Aetna Explosives Case-A Milestone in Reorganization, 20 Col. L.
Rev. 733 (1920).
34 Investment Registry, Ltd., v. Chi. & M. E. R. Co., 212 Fed. 594, 6og (C.C.A. 7th 1933).
3s As characterized by Mr. Rosenberg in A New Scheme of Reorganization, 17 Col. L. Rev.
523 (1917).
36 The cases cannot be considered here, but they are ably discussed in Swaine, Reorganiza-
tion of Corporations: Certain Developments of the Last Decade, 27 Col. L. Rev. 9o (1927),
28 Col. L. Rev. 29 (1928); Rosenberg, Reorganization, the Next Step, 3 Lectures on Legal
Topics 3 (1926) (presenting a somewhat different approach).
37 Swaine, Corporate Reorganization under the Federal Bankruptcy Power, x9 Va. L. Rev.
317, 318 (933).
3' § 77h. 3' § 77b.
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debentures, for example, may be substituted for mortgage bonds; unsecured
claims may be made payable in stock; principal or interest or both may be
scaled down; preferred stock may be changed into common; and so on, without
limit, subject only to the requirement that the plan shall be equitable. Since
securities with a lien prior to any previously issued may be provided for in the
plan, adequate security can be given for the new money which is usually neces-
sary to complete the reorganization and provide sufficient working capital.
Hitherto, in the absence either of unanimous consent by the holders of mort-
gage securities, or of payment to the dissenters of the cash value of their claims
against the property, there has been no way of giving the new money a prior
lien ;40 and this difficulty has prevented many forms of advantageous reorganiza-
tions. Under the new legislation, assuming always that the plan is fair, two-
thirds in amount of any class of mortgage creditors may compel the entire class,
without payment of cash to dissenters, to subordinate their liens to a new prior
lien or even to abandon their liens altogether.
It is only in cases where less than two-thirds of a particular class consent that
any difficulty is presented. But even then the plan may be confirmed if it pro-
vides4' for the realization of the value of the claims of the dissenting class in any
one of three ways, either (a) by the sale of the property subject to their liens, or
(b) by the transfer of their liens to the proceeds of any sale of the property (to
be sold at not less than a fair upset price), or (c) by payment in cash of the ap-
praised value of the claims or, at any objecting creditor's election, of the ap-
praised value of the new securities allotted to him under the plan. Thus an
equitable plan cannot be blocked even if less than two-thirds of a particular
class accept it. In practice, however, it is hardly likely that if the plan is in fact
equitable less than two-thirds of any class will withhold consent.
The plan, of course, may not affect at all a particular class of creditors, and
in such a case the consent of that class is not required.42 Similarly, if the plan
provides for full cash payment of the claims of a particular class, the consent of
that class is not required.42a
Analogous provisions are made with respect to stockholders. The consent of
two-thirds in amount of a class of stockholders binds the class. But if less than
two-thirds of the stockholders of a class consent, the plan may nevertheless be
confirmed if it provides43 for the realization of the value of their equities either
(a) by a sale of the property at not less than a fair upset price, or (b) by ap-
praisal and payment in cash of the value of their stock, or, at any objecting
stockholder's election, of the value of the securities, if any, allotted to the stock
under the plan. Finally, the consent of stockholders is not required at all if the
40 See Guaranty Trust Co. v. Chicago Union Traction Co. 158 Fed. 931 (C.C.A. 6th. 19o8);
Mlerchants' Loan & Trust Co. v. Chicago Rys. i58 Fed. 923 (C.C.A. 7th. 1907); Hanna et al. v.
State Trust Co. et al., 7o Fed. 2 (C.C.A. 8th. 1895); Doe v. Northwestern Coal Co., 78 Fed. 62
(C.C.A. Oregon 1896); International Trust Co. v. Decker Bros., 152 Fed. 78 (C.C.A. 9th. x907);
In re J. B. and J. M. Cornell Co., 201 Fed. 381 (D.C. N.Y. 1912).
4 § 77g and h. 4'2 § 77e. 41a § 77e. 43 § 77g and h.
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court has determined that the corporation is insolvent, or that their interests
will not be adversely affected, or that by authorized corporate action the plan
has been accepted and they are bound by this acceptance.44
Thus a complete method is provided by which both majorities and minorities
will be fairly restrained and at the same time given fair consideration. The only
criticism of the statute that might be ventured is that if, as a result of the dis-
sent of a particular class, it becomes necessary to determine a fair upset sale
price or the appraised value of securities, the commission is required to make
the determination.4s This is the only place in the statute where the commission
is given power to make final determinations affecting substantive rights. As
stated above, if it becomes necessary to determine the corporation's solvency or
insolvency the court is required to make that determination,46 and there seems
to be no good reason for shifting to the commission the similar and essen-
tially judicial function of fixing upset prices and appraising the value of
securities.
After the plan has been accepted and confirmed as described above there is
only one further step. The court directs that the property be transferred to a
new corporation or revested in the old, as the plan may require.47 By this simple
provision foreclosure proceedings, which hitherto have had to "drag their weary
and extravagant length through the court while the plan is being developed,"48
are completely eliminated.
The following miscellaneous provisions may be noted. (i) A subsidiary cor-
poration, or one whose properties are operated by the principal corporation
under lease or operating agreement, may join in the proceedings by filing a
petition stating that it is insolvent or unable to meet its debts as they mature
and that it desires to effect a plan of reorganization in connection with, or as a
part of, the plan of the principal corporation. Thereafter the proceedings with
respect to the subsidiary or leased road are the same as the proceedings with
respect to the principal road.49 (2) A proceeding under the new statute is not
made the exclusive remedy for reorganization, as shown by provisionsso for pay-
ment of the fees and expenses of a prior equity receivership (whether brought
about before or after the statute takes effect), and for transferring the property,
if the proceedings are dismissed without confirmation of a plan, to any equity
receiver appointed prior to such dismissal. However, the advantages of the new
procedure are so obvious that the courts will doubtless hesitate to act upon
creditors' bills for the appointment of receivers, particularly where the bills are
brought on the initiative of the debtor. (3) The Secretary of the Treasury is
authorized to accept or reject the plan in behalf of any interests or claims of the
United States.-'. This is an important provision, for the Government is a sub-
44 § 77e. 45 § 77g. 46 § 77e- 47 § 77j-
48 Rosenberg, A New Scheme of Reorganization, 17 Col. L. Rev. 523 (1917).
49 § 77a. so § 77k. S § 77e-
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stantial creditor of many railroads52 and hitherto the Secretary of the Treasury
has had no power to compromise its claims, exchange any of its securities or
obligations, or release any collateral.53 (4) By a sweeping provision, claims for
personal injuries to employees and claims of personal representatives of deceased
employees are made preferred claims against the assets, taking precedence even
over first mortgages.54 Other provisions are designed to prevent the courts and
trustees from changing wages or working conditions,S5 recognizing "yellow-dog"
contractss 6 or promoting company unions.57 (5) The so-called "six-months'
rule," giving priority over mortgages to claims for materials or services in con-
nection with maintenance and operation,s8 is recognized, and the holders of such
claims are treated as a separate class of creditors.9 (6) "Creditors" include the
holders of all claims "of whatever character against the debtor or its property,
including claims for future rent," whether or not such claims would otherwise
be provable under the Bankruptcy Act.63
The chief advantages of the new legislation may be summarized as follows.
The jurisdiction of the court is made absolutely certain, and "friendly" proceed-
ings are avoided. Ancillary receiverships and foreclosure proceedings are elimi-
nated. The procedure is expedited by placing primary responsibility for shaping
the plan upon a disinterested commission. The power of the court to reject an
inequitable plan is made definite and clear. Minorities are bound, and are
shorn of their power to delay, cripple or block a proper plan; and adequate se-
curity for those furnishing new money may be provided. Fees and expenses are
brought within the effective control of the court.
52 As a result of various provisions of the Transportation Act, 41 Stat. 456, Title ii, §§ 202,
204, 207, 209, 210 (1920).
3 33 Ops. Atty. Gen. 423 (1923); 34 Ops. Atty. Gen. 1o8 (1924). For several years the
Secretary of the Treasury has recommended a grant of such power, to be exercised with the
concurrence of the Commission. Annual Reports of the Secretary of the Treasury, 1930, p. 4o;
1931i, P- 35; 1932, P. 32. Bills to that effect were introduced but not enacted in the 71st Cong.,
2d Sess. [S. 4254, H.R. 12o6f], and in the 72d Cong., ist Sess. [H.R. io7461.
'4 § 77s.
.S .... except in the manner prescribed in the Railroad Labor Act, or as set forth in the
memorandum of agreement entered into in Chicago, Illinois, on January 3 1, 1932, between the
executives of twenty-one standard labor organizations and the committee of nine authorized
to represent Class i railroads."
56 § 77q.
s7 § 77P. All of these provisions relating to labor were introduced, as amendments to the
bill, by Senator Norris and were adopted without opposition, except that the phrase "yellow-
dog" was eliminated and a circumlocution adopted in its place. 76 Cong. Rec., 72d Cong., 2d
Sess. 5260.
58 Fosdick v. Schall, 99 U.S. 235, 9 Ott. 235, 25 L.Ed. 339 (1878); Wood v. Guarantee Trust,
etc., Co., 128 U.S. 416, 9 Sup. Ct. 13 1, 3 2 L.Ed. 472 (1888); Southern Railway v. Ca-negie Steel
Co., 176 U.S. 257, 20 Sup. Ct. 347, 44 L.Ed. 458 (igoo); Lackawanna, etc., Co. v. Farmers
Loan & Trust Co., x76 U.S. 298, 20 Sup. Ct. 347, 44 L.Ed. 475 (9oo).
s § 77c. ' § 77b.
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The legislation confers more responsibility and power upon the commission
than some have thought wise6' and less than others would have wished.62 But
it seems to strike a reasonable balance,63 and its advantages over the present
cumbersome, wasteful, dilatory and only partially effective procedure are nu-
merous and pronounced.
It is to be hoped that Congress will speedily adopt similar legislation relating
to the reorganization of industrial corporations. A bill to that effect (drafted
by the Solicitor General6 4 and used as a model for the railroad bill) passed the
the House in the last session of Congress,5 but due to pressure of time was not
61 The bill was modelled upon S. 4921 introduced on June 21, 1932 by Senator Hastings.
S. 4921 merely provided that the plan of reorganization must have the approval of the commis-
sion; there were no provisions giving the commission the power to appoint standing trustees, to
fix maximum limits for all fees and expenses, to determine upset prices, or to initiate plans.
62 The first bill introduced by Representative La Guardia, on December 29, 1932 [H.R.
13958] removed virtually all power, except a limited power of review, from the court. On Janu-
ary 9, 1933 he withdrew this bill and introduced H.R. 14110 (which passed the House as a
part of H.R. 14359), following the form of the original Hastings bill (note 6i supra) but giving
the commission substantially the powers described in note 61 supra and providing further that
the court, in passing on the plan, could act only on the record made before the commission.
63 The bill reached its final form only after extended conferences with, and various changes
suggested by, Solicitor General Thacher, Senator Hastings, representatives of the commission
and of the railroad executives, and many lawyers. See Senator Hastings' statements in 76
Cong. Rec., 72d Cong., 2d Sess., 503x, 5034, 5249, 5250.
64 H.R. 9968, S. 3866 introduced March i, 1932 and February 29, 1932 respectively, follow-
ing the nation-wide inquiry into the Bankruptcy Act conducted by the Department of Justice
at the direction of President Hoover. See the Attorney General's report containing the results
of this inquiry and the legislation suggested, together with the President's message relating
thereto. [Senate Document No. 65, 7 2d Cong., ist Sess.]
6s As a part of H.R. 14359, 72d Cong., 2d Sess. Except for the exclusion of matter relating
to the Interstate Commerce Commission, it differed from the railroad bill in only one important
particular; it permitted a dissenting lien creditor, even though more than two-thirds of the lien
creditors of his class accepted the plan, to insist (if he voiced his objection seasonably) either
upon payment in cash of the appraised value of his claim, or, at his election, of the appraised
value of the new securities allotted to his claim under the plan, or a sale of the property subject
to his lien, or a transfer of his lien to the proceeds of such sale. Under the railroad section, dis-
senting creditors are given these rights only if less than two-thirds of the class have accepted
the plan. Commenting upon this provision, Senator Hastings stated: "There has been much
controversy with respect to that provision, though not so much in the case of the railroad sec-
tion as in the case of the corporate section. To most of us it seems desirable that the two-thirds
shall be compelled to bind the one-third. Vhen we come to the corporate reorganization sec-
tion we have not written such provision in it, because we were afraid to do so, believing that
there would be serious objection to it; and I myself do not know whether I am for it or against
it." 76 Cong. Rec., 72d Cong. 2d Sess., 5034. It is to be hoped that the corporate reorganiza-
tion bill, when it is acted on, will be modified so as to enable two-thirds to bind the minority,
thus harmonizing the procedure with that adopted in the case of railroads, and following the
long-established principle of the English Companies Act (note 4 supra). The reorganization
procedure will thereby be rendered far more effective; the burden of raising cash for dissenters
will be avoided; while the power of the court to disapprove an inequitable or discriminatory
plan should be a sufficient safeguard for the minority.
